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DAWSON

v.

GOFF

[43 C.2d

to the conversation. There is
in plaintiff's
testimony to impugn his
He did all any lawyer of
the
professional standards could have done under
the conditions. Defendant waived plaintiff's disqualification
under the dead man's
(Deacon v. Bryans, 212
Cal. 87, 90-93 [298 P.
Defendant will be unable to
make any showing to the
of the
of plaintiff. Under these
the
should be reversed with directions as I have indicated. (Conner v.
Grosso, 41 Cal.2d 229, 232
P.2d 435] "
Dooling, J. pro

concurred.

[L. A. No. 23175.

In Bank.

July 30, 1954.]

DOROTHY C. DAWSON, as Special Administratrix, etc.,
et al., Appellants, v. CHARLES R. GOFF et al., Respondents.
[la, lb] Venue-Actions Ex Contractu.-Code Civ. Proc., § 395,
subd. 1, relating to venue in contract actions, requires that
all actions arising on contract shall be tried in county in which
defendant resides or in which contract was made, unless defendant has contracted specially and in writing as to county
in which his obligation is to be performed, in which event such
county is also a proper county for trial of action.
[2] !d.-Actions Ex Contractu.-As regards question of venue,
obligation of contract is incurred at time contract is made,
and obligations under it arise and are incurred in county in
which it is made.
[3] !d.-Actions Ex Contractu.-Under Code Civ. Proc., § 395,
subd. 1, relating to venue in contract actions, county where
contract is made is deemed to be county where it is to be
performed unless there is a special written contract to the
contrary.
[4] Corporations-Transfers of Stock-Sales-Questions of Law.
-Whether letter written by defendants to plaintiff in which
they "agree" to purchase certain corporate stock from plaintiff on demand and on which plaintiff's signature appears after
notation "Accepted," or whether plaintiff's subsequent written
[1] See Cal.Jur., Venue,§ 17 et seq.; Am.Jur., Venue,§ 19 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 12, 14] Venue, § 26; [4] Corporations, § 306; [5] Corporations, § 305; [6-11, 13] Contracts, § 17.
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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demand that defendants
such stock pursuant to the
writing, constitutes contract of sale is a question of
law in absence of extrinsic evidence on question.
!d.-Transfers of Stock--Sales-Options.-If letter written
defendants to plaintiff in which they "agree" to purchase
certain corporate stock at stated
from plaintiff and on
appears after notation "Accepted"
which plaintiff's
does not constitute a
contract for sale of stock because
it is lacking in mutual consent and consideration in that plaintiff does not promise to sell any stock to defendants, it can
constitute an offer by defendants to buy such number of shares,
not exceeding stated amount, as plaintiff desires to sell, in
which case plaintiff would have option to sell amount of stock
at stated price to defendants and they could not revoke offer
or option given to plaintiff during time specified because it is
supported by special consideration, such consideration being
presumed because of the writing.
[6] Contracts- Options.- In an option contract the optionor
stipulates that for specified or reasonable period he waives
right to revoke offer.
Id.-Options.-Civ. Code, §§ 1582, 1583, relating to mode of
communicating acceptance of proposal and when such communication is deemed complete, are applicable to acceptance or
exercise of option by optionee under option contract as well
as to a revocable offer.
[8] Id.-Options.-An option contract is different from contract
to which irrevocable offer of optionor relates, since optionee
by parting with special consideration for binding promise of
optionor refrains from binding himself with regard to contract to which the option relates.
!d.-Options.-While optionee incurs no liability with regard
to contract as to which he holds option, optionor has irrrevocably promised on exercise of option to perform contract on
terms specified in his binding offer, and creation of final contract requires no promise or other action by optionor because
contract is completed by aceeptance of offer by optionee.
[10] Id.-Options.-An option contract gives optionee a right
against optionor for performance of contract to which option
relates on exercise of option, which optionor cannot defeat
by repudiating option.
[11] Id.-Options.-Since optionor promises to perform contract
to which option relates, subject to a condition at discretion of
optionee, option contract involves on part of optionor a unilateral promise to perform obligations of contract to which
option relates.
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 15; Am.Jur., Contracts, § 27.
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[12] Venue-Actions Ex Contractu.-Rule that
agreement
of
to perform obligation of
relates should be applied in interpretto venue in contract actions,
to have action tried in
residence unless he
contracted to perform
his
under contract in another county.
Contracts-Options.-In
contract, though option
optionee, defendant optionor
as far as he is con[14]

court could reafor purpose of determining venue, that
defendants to plaintiff in which they "agree"
uLu.cuu~e certain
stock from plaintiff was a bindcontract inasmuch as it does not show on its face
that there was no
consideration and rebuttable preof consideration applies, defendants would have inua;c;u·"'"'H on date such instrument was executed, and
been executed in county in which defendants reside
failed to bring himself within any exceptions in Code Civ. Proc., § 395, relating to venue in contract
actions, such county is proper county in which to have action
tried for breach of contract to purchase stock.

.APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County granting motion for change of venue. Ellsworth Meyer, Judge. Affirmed.
Jackson &

Ridgway Sutton and Caryl

vVarner for Appellants.
Mcinnis & Hamilton, Mcinnis, Hamilton & Fitzgerald and
,John vV. Mcinnis for Respondents.
CARTER, J.-Plaintiffs, the administratrix of the estate
of C. L. Dawson, Jr., deceased, and two other Dawsons, commenced, in Los .A.ngeles County, an action against defendants
Goff and Garland, alleging in their complaint that on February
26, 1953, a written contract of sale was made in Los Angeles
County in which plaintiffs agreed to sell and defendants to
buy 28,800 shares of stock in Grand Stores Company, at $2.53
per share, to be paid within three years with interest at 5 per
cent. Plaintiffs' tendered delivery of the stock on February
26th, 1953, was refused by defendants on March 10, 1953,
whereupon plaintiffs notified defendants that they would
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instrument was
on the date it
1950
California
Mr. Dawson:
to
from you, your
upon demand vvritten or verbal at any time
not exceed
thousand ( 40,000)
of $2.53 per
Stores Co for a
The terms of the
for this stock to be deat the time demand is made but in
termined
any case full
is to be made
that
and interest on deferred
Yours very
CHARLES R. GoFF
R. HASTINGS GARLAND
2/28/50
terminates if no demand is made on FebCHARLES

R.

GoFF

c. L. DAWSON, JR."
stated for deceased in the inApparently the number of
the
to 30,300 on
County, plaintiffs
defendants in San
County a writwrote and mailed
entitled Demand to Purchase Stock Pursuant to Option
that defendants purchase 28,800 shares
of stock pursuant to the instrument dated February 28th,

contract
men395 of the Code of Civil Procedure;* that
San
the proper
the basis of the action~the instrument
1950~was made there. Plaintiffs assert
that the document dated
28th,
was merely an
offer and that the contract was not made until they accepted
the offer by their demand that plaintiffs take the
which
they say was made in Los Angeles
when the demand
was
in
United States mail there, and hence the
contract was made in Los Angeles County and it was a
proper county for the trial of the action.
Section 395, supra, has been interpreted to mean that the
opening clause, "\vhen defendant has contracted to perform
an obligation in a
' has no particular significance as a limitation on the rest of the sentence. [1a] The
section in effect says that " . . . all actions
on contract
shall be tried in the
in which the defendant
or
in which the contract was
unless the defendant has
contracted specially and in
as to the
in which
his obligation is to be
in which event such county
is also a proper
for the trial of action." (Armstrong
exccr't

in thi~ section otherwi8e provided,
the court to tnuu;ft>r ndions or
aq
in this title, the cmmty in whieh the
or some
of
rcsiile nt the commenremcnt of the m:tion, is the proper county
for the trial of the action . . . . .,\Vhen a defendant has contracted to
ped'onn an
either the
where
such
the contrnct in
>vas
entered
or any such defendant,
resides at
commencement of the action, shall
a proper county for
the trial of nn aetion founded on such olJligatlon, and the county in
which such
is incurred slwll be deemed to be the county
in which it is
specin 1 contract ht
'niting to the contrary. '
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basis of action, was made in Los -="'"c"c"
not
say it is to be
Plaintiffs
in their complaint, as a basis for their
that a contract was entered into in Los Angeles County
·when
'
" what is claimed was defendants' offer,
their affidavits are to the same effect. No answer denying
such allegation has been filed but the affidavits of defendants
show the transactions and
involved and that the
so-called
was the
relied on by plaintiffs
in their
as the eontract made in Los Angeles
There is no dispute that the transaetions were such
as are heretofore set forth. It is not important, therefore,
that there is no express denial of the
[4] Which
paper is the contract is a
of law in the absence of extrinsic evidence on the question, assummg it would be admissible.
[5] Assuming the
1950,
did not
constitute a
contract for the sale of the stock because
was lacking in mutual consent and consideration in that
plaintiffs did not promise to sell any stock or any number of
shares to
it could constitute an offer by the
(defendants) to buy such number of shares, not exceedthe stated amount, as the sellers (plaintiffs) desired to sell.
stated in another way, since plaintiffs had an option to
sell an amount of stock at a stated price to defendants, the
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an
or reasonable
B1'0S.

[192 P.2d
however, when
(the contract for
when
mailed
stock, which was in
the purpose of the venue oc<<~>uccco.
tract which was entered into
[7] As to the first
the communication
conditions
the proposer is not bound unless
are conformed to ; but
in other cases any reasonable and usual mode may be '"'''n"r"'n
( Oiv. Code, §
''Consent is deemed to be
municated between the
a proposal has
his
course of transmission to the proposer, in
to the last section.''
(Oiv. Code, § 1583.) Those sections have been held applicable to acceptance or exercise of an
an optionee
under an option contract as well as to a revokable offer. (See
Canty v. Brown, 11
487
P.
, Shubert
Theatrical Co. v.
271 F. 827; contra Corbin on Contracts, § 264.)
[8] In regard to the second
this court in Warner
31 Cal.2d 766 [192 P.2d 949,
Bros. Pictures v. Brodel,
3 A.L.R.2d 691], was concerned with a
of whether
a contract to perform services was
within the
terms of a statute dealing with
by the court, an option contract had been
to the proposed recipient of the services. We held that the contract
to perform the services was made when the
contract
was made although recognizing the
rule that where
there is an option contract, there are two
the option
contract and the contract to which it relates. We said (p.
772) : "Such a contract is
different from the contract to which the irrevocable offer of the optionor relates,
*''A written instrument is
(Civ. Code, § 1614; see Code

8\'idence of consideration."
Proc., § 1963, subd. 39.)

nrPR1m1nr1
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(The contract

an
contract involves on the
unilateral.
to perform the
contract to which the option relates. . . .
follows that even
the
differs from
the

or render services.' "
v. El Royale Corp., 54
[12] We can see no reason
m
section
supra, because it gives
action tried in the county
contracted to perform his
under the contract in another county. The exis concerned with where
incurred the
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It is what his rela-

'J'he order is afiirmed.
Shenk Aeting 0. J., Edmonds, J ..
and Dooling, J. pro tem.,'-'' concurred.
SOHAUKn, J.-1 concur in the
the opinion but for
of
to point ont that the
here

Spence, J.,
and generally in
deem it proper
with which we are
a concomitant
from an option to
to
No one,
to sell
conversely,
tender by the
the stock described
for breach.

